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The  Cigarette, Risk,  and American 
Culture 
On  Saturday,  January  11,  1964,  Surgeon  General  Luther 
Terry  stepped  to  the  podium  of  the  State Department 
auditorium  to  begin  a nationally  televised  press  conference. 
Seated  directly  behind  him  were  ten  eminent  physicians  and  scien 
tists,  the members  of  his  Advisory  Committee  on  Smoking  and 
Health.  This  group  of  individuals had met  regularly over  the  last 
eighteen  months  to  evaluate  the  evidence  about  the  risks  of  cigarette 
smoking. Although  the results of  this investigation had been held  top 
secret,  signs  prohibiting  smoking  hung  in  the  auditorium,  a harbinger 
of  the  coming  announcement.  In  the  outside  corridors,  members  of 
the  press  puffed  away.  Reporters  were  offered  copies  of  the  report  in 
the  closed  auditorium  for  an  hour  before  the  press  conference.  At  the 
conclusion  of  the  session,  they  rushed  to  phones  to  call  in  the  story. 
The  next  day,  the  report  received  front-page  coverage  throughout  the 
country. 
For  the  70  million  regular  smokers  in  the United  States,  the  report 
constituted  bad  news.  It found  that  among  men  who  smoke  cigarettes 
the death  rate from cancer of  the lung  was  1,000  percent higher  than 
among  nonsmokers.  The  report  also  cited  chronic  bronchitis  and 
emphysema  to  be  of  far  greater  incidence  among  smokers.  Addition 
ally,  the  committee  found  that  the  incidence  of  coronary  artery 
disease,  the  leading  cause  of  death  in  the United  States, was  70 
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percent  higher  among  smokers.  In  short,  cigarette  smokers  placed 
themselves  at  much  higher  risk  of  serious  disease  than  did  non 
smokers.1 
These  findings,  contained  in  the  massive  387-page  document, 
which  cited  thousands of  research studies, held  few surprises. In fact, 
the  committee  had  conducted  no  new  research.  It  had  merely 
reviewed  existing  data.  And  indeed,  since  the  early  twentieth  century 
and beyond,  physicians  had pointed  out  hazards  of  cigarette  smok 
ing.  As  long  as  there  have  been  cigarettes  there  has  been  concern 
about  their  impact  on  health.  By  the  time  of  the  release  of  the  report, 
polls  showed  that most  Americans  already  associated  cigarettes  with 
cancer.  If  such  information  was  widely  known,  what  is  the meaning 
of  the  surgeon  general's  committee  report,  and  what  was  its  signifi 
cance?  What  were  the  social  and  scientific  forces which  led to  the 
report  and  what  was  its  impact? 
The  report  marked  the  beginning  of  a  revolution  in  attitudes  and 
behaviors  relating  to  cigarettes.  In  the  last  quarter  century,  half  of  all 
living  Americans  who  have  ever  smoked  have  now  quit.  At  the  time 
of  the  1964  report, 42  percent  of  all U.S.  adults  smoked;  in 1989, 
only  26  percent  were  smokers.  According  to  the most  recent  Surgeon 
General's  Report  (1989),  approximately  750,000  smoking-related 
deaths  have  been  avoided  since  1964  because  people  have  quit  or  not 
started  smoking.2  Terry's  Surgeon  General's  Report  signaled  the 
beginning  of  a  profound  change  in  the meaning  of  the  cigarette  and 
spurred  new  interest  more  generally  in  the  relationship  of  behavior, 
risk,  and  health. 
This  essay briefly  traces the history  of  the debate  about  the risk of 
smoking  and  places  the  Surgeon  General's  Report  in  a  broader 
context  by  examining  the  process  by which  the  cigarette  came  to  be 
defined  as  a major  health  risk. The  report  raised  fundamental 
questions  about  the  nature  of  biomedicine,  public  health,  and  espe 
cially causal  inference;  it profoundly  altered  the  way  we  think about 
issues of  health  and  disease. This was  part  of  a broader  debate  in 
twentieth-century  science  about  the  nature  of  evidence,  proof,  and 
causality,  a debate  about  the  epistemological  foundations  of  biomed 
icine.  How  do we  know  what  we  know?  What  constitutes  "proof"  in 
modern  science?  What  is  the  nature  of  causal  relationships?  And 
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The  cigarette  provides  a means  of  tracing  an  important  watershed 
in  medical  "ways  of knowing."  But  the  issues raised go  beyond  the 
realm of  biomedicine;  the debate  about  smoking was  shaped by  the 
meaning  of  the  cigarette  in American  culture,  the  nature  of  the 
tobacco  industry,  public  health,  and  government.  In  short,  the 
process  by  which  risk  is  assessed  and  perceived  reveals  deep  social, 
cultural,  and  political  values.3 
THE  RISE  OF  THE  CIGARETTE 
In  many  ways  the  cigarette  seems  such  a ubiquitous  part  of American 
culture  that  it  is difficult  to  imagine  that  it  is really  a  twentieth 
century  phenomenon.  Between  1900  and  1965,  per  capita  consump 
tion  rose  from  49  to  4,318. 
Developments  in  agricultural  technique,  production  technology, 
and  industrial  organization,  as well  as  such  factors  as  the  introduc 
tion  of  the  portable  match,  all  contributed  to  the  growth  of  the 
tobacco  industry.4  The  cigarette  marks  the  convergence  of  corporate 
capitalism,  technology,  mass  marketing,  and,  in  particular,  the  im 
pact  of  advertising.5 These  forces  induced new modes  of  individual 
and  group  behavior.  With  the  rise  of  consumerism,  a new  behavioral 
ethic  was  defined.  From  a  culture  that  promoted  self-denial  and 
self-discipline  in  the  late  nineteenth  century?one  condemning  indul 
gence  in  all  forms?Americans  were  now  encouraged  to  indulge. 
As  individuals  came  to  fear  the  loss  of  autonomy  in  an  industrial 
world,  cigarette  smoking  promised  individual  redemption.  The  Marl 
boro  man  was  the  first  urban-industrial  cowboy,  a  symbol  of 
modernity,  autonomy,  power,  and  sexuality.  Such  advertising 
pointed  away  from  the  product  toward  the moral  and  psychological 
value  of  the  patron.6  Advertising  promised  consumers  well-being  and 
power.7  Creating  demand  for  relatively  undifferentiated,  nonessential 
items  was  the  core  of  the  new  consumer  culture,  which  the  cigarette 
epitomizes.  The  tobacco  industry  boomed,  as  did  state  revenues 
associated  with  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  cigarettes.  When  de 
mand  for  cigarettes  rose,  so  too  did  concern  about  their  impact  on 
health. 
As  cigarette  smoking  became  increasingly  popular  in  the  early 
twentieth  century,  claims  for  its virtues  and  vices  ran  strong.  Though 
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dramatic  rise  in  smoking  was  accompanied  by  a  powerful  anti 
cigarette movement  which  sought  to  identify both  the  moral  and  the 
health  risks of  tobacco. By  the first decade  of  the twentieth  century, 
concerns  about  the  demoralizing  impact  of  the  cigarette  were  widely 
cited. 
Boys were  often  caught  sneaking  off  behind  school  buildings  to 
smoke  in  groups,  and  "cigarette  fiends"  were  identified  as  a major 
social  problem  of  the  growing  cities.  Among  the  most  prominent 
anti-cigarette  crusaders  was  Henry  Ford.  "If  you  will  study  the 
history  of  almost  any  criminal you will  find  that he  is an  inveterate 
cigarette  smoker,"  advised  Ford.8 He  donated  the  funds  for  the 
publication  of a national  journal  which  appeared under  the title "The 
Case  Against  the  Little  White  Slaver."  On  another  occasion  Ford 
explained,  "With  every  breath  of  cigarette  smoke  they  inhale  imbe 
cility  and  exhale  manhood_The  yellow  finger  stain  is an  emblem 
of  deeper  degradation  and  enslavement  than  the  ball  and  chain." 
Ford enlisted Thomas  Edison  to investigate scientifically the harms of 
smoking. 
In  addition  to  the  concern  expressed  about  young  boys  smoking, 
anti-cigarette  activists  centered  attention  on  the  detrimental  conse 
quences  of  smoking  for women?now  vigorously  solicited  as  smok 
ers?and  its  impact  on  their  health  and  social  mores.9  As  the 
movement  for  prohibition  gathered  momentum,  cigarettes  were 
frequently  tied  to  the  use  of  alcohol.  By  the  First World  War,  some 
thirteen  states  had  enacted  legislation  prohibiting  or  regulating  the 
sale  of  cigarettes;  anti-cigarette  activists  often  cited  medical  and 
scientific  experts  in  support  of  such  controls.10 
By  the  1920s,  as  consumption  continued  to  rise,  research  into  the 
consequences  of  smoking  intensified.  Researchers  focused  attention 
on  the  impact  of  tobacco  on  what  they  called  "mental  efficiency." 
Usually  in such studies, smokers fared poorly.11 But  the problem with 
such  research  was  clear;  as  one  scientist  explained,  "It might  be  either 
that the smoking habit  induces lethargy or  that lazy  men  are the kind 
that  find  smoking  agreeable."12  This  problem  of  inference  would 
continue  to  plague  the  debate  about  smoking  into  our  time.  Other 
studies  concentrated  on  the  physical  growth  and  development  of 
smokers;  did  cigarette  smoking  stunt  growth?13  The  moralistic 
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It could  be  argued  that moral  reformers  protesting  the  rising  use  of 
cigarettes  in  America  hid behind  the cloak  of  scientific authority  in 
offering  their  arguments.  But  this would  misrepresent  their  ideas  and 
tactics.  They  simply  saw  no  tension  in  seeing  the  cigarette  as  ungodly 
and unhealthy;  they equated moral  dangers  and health  risks.  Moral 
reformers  had  absolutely  no  compunction  about  employing  argu 
ments  based on weak  data about  the physically debilitating  impact of 
smoking.  Medical  doctors  and  researchers  moved  easily  between 
citing the  moral  and citing the health  consequences  of  smoking;  there 
was  no  attempt  to  differentiate  such  arguments. 
MODERN  EPIDEMIOLOGY  AND  STATISTICAL  INFERENCE 
By  the  late  1920s,  researchers  began  to  focus  more  precisely  on  the 
specific  health  consequences  of  smoking.  As  early  as  1928,  in a 
somewhat  primitive  epidemiological  study,  researchers  associated 
heavy  smoking with  cancer.14 In addition,  surgeons published  clinical 
reports  associating  cancer  in  their  patients  with  their  smoking 
habits.15  In  1931,  Frederick  L.  Hoffman,  a well-known  statistician 
for  the  Prudential  Insurance  Company,  tied  smoking  to  cancer. 
Hoffman  noted  the difficulties of  conducting  epidemiological  studies 
in  this  area.  The  basic  methodological  questions  of  statistical  re 
search?issues  of  representativeness,  sample  size,  and  the  construc 
tion  of  control  groups?all  presented  researchers  with  a  series  of 
complex  problems.  Hoffman  called  for  the  exercise  of moderation  in 
all  behavior,  a  truism  of  progressive  hygiene,  suggesting  that  "ex 
treme  moderation  in  smoking  habits  would  certainly  be  advisable."16 
In  1938,  Raymond  Pearl,  the  Johns  Hopkins  statistician  and 
biometrician,  published  the first  significant  statistical analysis of  the 
health  impact  of  smoking.  Pearl  came  to  the  conclusion  that  in 
individuals  it was  difficult  to  assess  the  risks  of  such  behaviors, 
especially  when  their  impact  was  not  immediate  and  when  many 
intervening  variables  also  affected  health.  Therefore,  he  concluded, 
the  only  precise  way  to  evaluate  their  effect  on  health  was  to  employ 
statistical  methods  after  collecting  data  on  large  groups.  Comparing 
the  mortality  curves  of  smokers  and  nonsmokers,  Pearl  found  that 
individuals who  smoked  could  expect  shorter  lives. He  offered  no 
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During  the 1920s  and 1930s,  as the first studies attempting  to link 
cigarettes  to  cancer  were  conducted,  the  field  of  epidemiology  stood 
at  a  crossroads.  The  bacteriological  revolution  of  the  late  nineteenth 
and  early  twentieth  century  had  directed  attention  away  from  the 
traditional  environmental  questions  which  had  brought  epidemiol 
ogy  to  the  fore.  Research  came  to  center  on  mechanism:  identifying 
causative  agents,  universally  assumed  to  be microorganisms.  Indeed, 
the  notion  that  disease  was  actually  "caused"  by  hazards  in  the 
environment  fell into disrepute. Public health officers were  compelled 
to  demonstrate  Robert  Koch's  postulates,  the  fundamental  truths  of 
the  new  germ  theory.18  There  were,  of  course,  exceptions  to  this 
trend,  especially  in  the  study  of  industrial  and  occupational  health. 
But  these  fields  for  the  most  part  were  distant  from  the  central 
concerns  of medicine  and  public  health.  In  fact,  the major  statistical 
work  of  the  period  came  from  population  genetics  and  the  actuarial 
studies  of  the  insurance  industry,  rather  than  from  the  disciplines  of 
public  health. Neither  Hoffman  nor  Pearl would  have  considered 
himself  an epidemiologist. 
The  municipal  laboratory had  become  the new  focus  of  public 
health.  Even  when  researchers  identified  environmental  or  behavioral 
risks,  they  generally  focused  on  the mechanism  of  disease.  The  whole 
notion  of  statistical  inference  was  questioned,  as  research  centered  on 
the  cellular  level.  In  this  respect,  exposure  to  a  carcinogen  was 
equated  with  exposure  to  an  infectious  organism.  Identifying  the 
health  risks of  a particular  behavior  like smoking  fitted  this model 
poorly.  The  length  of  time  before  the  disease  developed  was  pro 
tracted  (and  equated  with  an  "incubation  period");  in  addition,  the 
large  number  of  intervening  variables  confounded  notions  of  specific 
causality.  Everyone  "exposed"  did  not  get  the  disease;  indeed,  most 
did  not;  and  some  who  were  not  exposed  did.  Also,  there  was  broad 
cultural  discomfort  with  notions  of  comparative  risk  assessment. 
How  dangerous  was  the  cigarette?  How  did  this  danger  rate  vis-?-vis 
other  risks? Finally, medical  theory offered  few persuasive models  for 
understanding  systemic  and  chronic  diseases;  the  anomalies  of  ciga 
rette  smoking  did  not  fit  the biom?dical  model's  ideal of  specific 
causality. 
Changing  patterns  of  disease,  however,  forced  researchers  to 
search for other models  of causality. By  the end of  the Second  World 
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statisticians  and  physicians  to  be  a  striking  exception  to many  other 
disease  patterns  of  the  twentieth  century;  deaths  from  lung  cancer 
had  risen from 4,000  in 1935  to 11,000  in 1945. By  1960  the number 
of  annual  lung  cancer  deaths  would  rise  to  36,000.19  By  the  mid 
1980s  carcinoma  of  the  lung would  become  the most  prevalent  of  all 
cancers,  accounting  for more  than  140,000  deaths  each  year.  Yet,  at 
the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  disease  was  a  relative  rarity, 
with  less than 400  cases  recorded  in 1900. 
There  were,  of  course,  many  theories  to  account  for  this  shift. 
Some  observers  attributed  the  rise  in  cases  to  better  reporting,  more 
sophisticated  diagnostic  abilities,  the widespread  use  of  X  rays,  and 
the  ability  to make  precise  pathological  analyses.  Others  suggested 
that  increasing  life  expectancy  permitted  the  development  of  disease 
that  in  an  earlier  era  would  not  have  had  the  chance  to wreak  its 
havoc  on  victims  who  would  die  earlier  deaths  from  other  causes.20 
But  some physicians  and public  health  officers pointed  to one  of 
the  most  dramatic  behavioral  changes  in  the  history  of  American 
culture,  the  rise  of  cigarette  smoking.  By  the  late  1940s  it  was  already 
known  that  prolonged  exposure  to  certain  industrial  chemicals  and 
vapors?chromate,  nickel  carbonyl,  and  radioactive  dusts?could 
produce  lung  cancer.  Some  scientists  now  suggested  that  the  inhala 
tion of cigarette smoke might  have  similar effects. This  hypothesis  led 
to a  series of  epidemiological  studies of  the risk of  smoking. These 
studies,  in  turn,  would  lead  to  a  redefinition  of  risk,  epidemiology, 
and public  health. 
First  published  in  the  1950s,  these  investigations  were  based  upon 
retrospective  findings:  in  other  words,  individuals  with  lung  cancer 
were  identified  in hospitals  and  interviewed regarding their smoking 
practices;  they were  then  compared  with  a  similar  group  who  did  not 
smoke.  The  findings  revealed  that  cigarette  smokers  were  at  far 
higher  risk  for  the  development  of  lung  cancer  than  were  non 
smokers.  But  critics  raised  a  series  of  objections  to  such  studies.  In 
particular,  it  was  clear  that  there  were  a number  of  opportunities  for 
bias  in  the  construction  of  sample  and  control  groups.  For  example, 
it  was  suggested  that  lung  cancer  patients  were  likely,  because  of  the 
nature  of  their  disease,  to  exaggerate  their  smoking  habits.21 
Given  the methodological  problems  with  retrospective  studies,  two 
major  prospective  studies  on  smoking  and  cancer  were  begun  in 
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Richard  Doll  and  Bradford  Hill  sent  questionnaires  on  smoking 
practices  to  all  British  physicians.22  When  members  of  the  profession 
died,  Doll  and Hill  obtained  data  concerning  the  cause  of  their 
deaths.  The  results  were  consistent  with  the  earlier  findings  from  the 
retrospective  studies.23 
A  second  major  prospective  study,  conducted  by  E.  Cuyler  Ham 
mond  under  the  auspices  of  the  American  Cancer  Society,  led  to 
similar  conclusions.  Total  death  rates were  far higher  among  smokers 
than  among  nonsmokers.  Lung  cancer  deaths  were  3  to  9  times  as 
high  among  smokers  as  among  nonsmokers,  5  to  16  times  as  high 
among  heavy  smokers.  Among  those  who  smoked  two  or  more 
packs  a  day,  the  death  rates  were  2.25  times  as  high  as  for men  who 
had  never  smoked,  a  strong  indication  of  a  dose  effect.  Excess 
mortality  was  even  higher  for  coronary  artery  disease  than  for  lung 
cancer;  rates  for  smokers  exceeded  those  for  nonsmokers  by  70 
percent.  Quitting,  Hammond  found,  reduced  risk;  formerly  a  heavy 
smoker, he himself  now  quit.24 By  1960,  a range of  epidemiological 
studies  had  all  arrived  at  consistent  findings:  cigarette  smoking 
significantly  contributed  to  lung  cancer  and  coronary  artery  disease.25 
These  epidemiological  studies  introduced  the  concept  of  large, 
population-based  surveys.  They  focused  attention  on  the  definition  of 
comparative  risk  and  excess  mortality.  Implicit  in  such  studies  was  a 
critique  of  the  whole  notion  of  specific  causality;  these  researchers 
recognized  that  there were  literally  hundreds  of  variables  affecting  the 
incidence  of  disease.  Therefore  they  sought  to  design  studies  which, 
by  including many  individuals, would  be  controlled  except  for  a 
single  variable?in  this  case,  cigarette  smoking. 
This mode  of  research touched off an  important debate within  the 
scientific  community  about  the  nature  of  causality,  proof,  and  risk. 
At  stake  were  the  very  epistemological  foundations  of  scientific 
knowledge:  How  do we  know what we  know? What  is the reliability 
of  causal  inference  from  statistical  data?  Those  committed  to  hered 
itarian,  genetic  views  of  cancer,  for  example,  found  fault  with  an 
epidemiologic  approach  which  centered  attention  on  behavioral 
effects.26 
At  the  basis  of  the  epidemiological  argument  was  the  clear 
limitation  of  laboratory  experimentation  for making  determinations 
about  probability  and  risk. The  debate  about  smoking  and health 
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science,  a  clash  of  values,  assumptions,  and  expectations.  Moreover, 
the debate  revealed  a deeper  discomfort  with  statistical  logic  and 
quantitative  methods  in biomedicine,  a  trend  which  persists  today.27 
Before  any  successful  anti-cigarette  campaign  could  be  waged,  the 
legitimacy  of  epidemiological  data  concerning  risk  for  generating 
health  policy would  have  to be  established. 
FROM  EPIDEMIOLOGY  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY 
Knowledge  of  the  risks  of  smoking?which  continued  to  accrue 
throughout  the 1950s?did  not  immediately  lead to the formulation 
of  public  policy.  Indeed,  there was  considerable  debate  about  the 
implications of  these findings  for public health  authorities.  What  was 
the  appropriate  role  of  the  state  vis-?-vis  the  risks  of  cigarette 
smoking?  Should  the  government  play  a  role  in  educating  its  citizens 
about  the hazards of  smoking? Recognizing  the gravity of  the hazard, 
should  the  government  take  steps  to  regulate  the  sale  of  cigarettes 
more  aggressively,  or  restrict  their  use?  These  questions,  of  course, 
were  complicated  by  the  nature  of  the  behavior  itself:  no  one  need  be 
exposed  to  the  hazards  of  smoking  unless  he  or  she  so  chose;  the 
"voluntary"  nature  of  the  risks,  it  was  argued,  militated  against  any 
governmental  intervention. 
The  first  step which  the  federal government  took?haltingly,  in 
1962?was  to  sponsor  a  commission  to  study  the  evidence  that 
cigarettes  were  harmful.  In  some  respects,  this was  a  curious  way  to 
proceed,  given  the  quality  of  the  evidence  which  already  existed.  But 
the  creation  of  the  Surgeon  General's  Advisory  Commission  on 
Smoking  and  Health  revealed  the  political  aspects  of  the  debate.28 
First,  powerful  economic  interests  repeatedly  called  the  epidemiolog 
ical  findings  into  question,  suggesting  that  the  relationship  of  ciga 
rettes  to  disease  was  "merely  statistical"  and  that  no  clear  and 
objective  findings  confirmed  these  risks "in  the  laboratory."29 The 
industry  responded  to  the  epidemiological  data  with  advertising 
campaigns  which  assured  the  public  their  brands  were  safe,  at  the 
same  time  that  it  introduced  filter  cigarettes  with  expansive  claims  for 
health  and  safety.30  The  industry  worked  diligently  to undermine,  if 
not  obscure,  public  perceptions  of  the  risk  of  the  cigarette.  Second, 
there  was  no  single,  authoritative  "reading"  of  the  mounting  evi 
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voluntary  health  agencies,  realized  that  the  findings  linking  cigarettes 
to disease had  to be  legitimated  in the  medical  and  scientific commu 
nities,  as well  as  among  the  public.31  Identifying  "risk  factors"  for 
disease  would  become  an  increasingly  important  aspect  of  the work 
of  the  "voluntaries,"  eager  to  assure  the  public?and  especially 
contributors?of  progress  in  finding  "the  cause"  of  serious  chronic 
disease.32 
The  advisory  committee,  appointed  in  July  1962,  explicitly 
avoided  all questions  of  social policy;  its charge was  to determine 
whether  or  not  smoking  caused  disease.  But  it  conducted  no  new 
research.  The  committee  reviewed  some  7,000  publications,  includ 
ing  3,000  research  reports  published  since  1950.33  It sought  to  arrive 
at  a  clinical  judgment  on  smoking.  As  one  public  health  official 
explained,  "What  do  we  (that  is,  the  surgeon  general  of  the  United 
States  Public  Health  Service)  advise  our  patient,  the American  public, 
about  smoking?"  Implicit  in  this  question  was  a  particular  model  of 
public  health  and  the role of  the state. 
The  report,  despite  the  fact  that  it offered  no  new  data,  nevertheless 
made  a  fundamental  contribution  to  the  study  of  causal  inference  in 
epidemiological  studies.  What  did  it mean  to  say,  for  example,  that 
cigarettes  caused  lung  cancer?  How  should  "cause"  be  distinguished 
from  "associated  with," 
" 
a  factor,"  or  "determinant"?  Members  of 
the  committee  realized  the  complexity  of  saying  simply  that  smoking 
causes  cancer.  Many  individuals  could  smoke  heavily  throughout 
their  lives  and  apparently  suffer  no  adverse  consequences;  "cause" 
implied a  single process  in  which  A,  by necessity, would  lead to B. 
Therefore,  they acknowledged  the complexity:  "It should be  said at 
once,"  the  report  explained,  "that  no member  of  this  Committee  used 
the  word  'cause'  in  an  absolute  sense  in  the  area  of  this  study. 
Although  various  disciplines  and fields of  scientific knowledge  were 
represented  among  the membership,  all members  shared  a  common 
conception  of  the multiple  etiology  of  biological  processes.  No 
member  was  so  naive  as  to  insist  upon  mono-etiology  in pathological 
processes  or  in  vital  phenomena."34  Yet  their  conviction  was  clear: 
smoking  presented  a  tremendous  risk  to  health.  The  committee 
developed  a  set  of  criteria  for  evaluating  causal  relationships  which 
has been widely  applied  since that time. Causal  evidence had  to be  (1) 
consistent,  (2)  strong,  (3)  specific,  (4),  supportive  of  appropriate 
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announcing  the  committee's  findings,  Terry  was  asked  whether  he 
would  now  recommend  to  a patient  to  stop  smoking.  His  answer  was 
an  unequivocal  "yes." 
The  report  served  the  political  functions  on  which  it was  predi 
cated.  It provided  power  and  legitimacy  to  the epidemiologic  find 
ings;  indeed,  the  report  was  of  fundamental  importance  in raising  the 
stature  of  epidemiology  as  a  discipline.  It made  clear  that  the 
government  would  accept  broader  responsibility  for  the  determina 
tion  of  risks  and  for  public  education  to  prevent  disease.  The  ability 
of  self-interested  parties  such  as  the  tobacco  industry  to  disparage 
such findings was  now  delimited. With  the first Surgeon General's 
Report,  the  battle  against  the  cigarette  was  joined;  less  obvious  was 
how  the  government  would  utilize  this  document  in  setting  a  public 
health  agenda. 
THE  TOBACCO  WARS 
In  retrospect,  the  immediate  public  and  political  response  to  the 
Surgeon  General's  Report  appears  strikingly  naive.  Newspapers 
reporting  the findings  speculated  that  the  tobacco  industry would 
wither  away.  The  presumption  was  widely  held  that  smokers?now 
apprised  of  the risks?would  quickly  quit.  In Congress,  such  ideas 
influenced  legislators, who  in  1965  passed  the Federal  Cigarette 
Labeling  and Advertising  Act.  The  legislation  established  the Na 
tional  Clearinghouse  on  Smoking  and  Health  to  encourage  health 
education  about  the  dangers  of  smoking.  In  addition  it required  that 
all  packs  of  cigarettes  carry  a warning:  "Caution:  Cigarette  Smoking 
May  Be Hazardous  to Your  Health."  Given  that  the  surgeon  general 
had  found  that  smoking  causes  lung  cancer,  the  warning  was 
remarkably  weak,  indicating  the  effectiveness  of  the  tobacco  lobby  on 
Capitol Hill.  It further reflected the relative  lack of  experience most 
legislators had had with  scientific findings. At  the hearings  concern 
ing this legislation,  tobacco  spokesmen  challenged  the findings of  the 
surgeon  general.  By  treating  all  perspectives  as  those  of  "interested" 
parties  to  be  brokered  in  the  political  process,  members  of  Congress 
sought  compromise.  Moreover,  the  powerful  economic  interests, 
especially  of  tobacco-growing  states,  acted  forcefully  to  moderate 
any  regulatory  initiatives.36  Nevertheless,  as  scientific  studies  col 
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cigarette  as  a major  cause  of  serious  disease,  Congress  took  addi 
tional  action.  In  1971,  the  label was  changed  to  "Warning:  the 
Surgeon General Has  Determined  that Cigarette  Smoking  Is  Danger 
ous  to  your  Health."  And,  in  1985,  four  rotating  labels  were 
mandated.37 
Increasingly,  the  battle  over  the  nature  of  the  risks  of  smoking 
would  be waged  in  the media.  Luther  Terry's  effective  control  of  the 
media,  for  example,  greatly  contributed  to  the  success  of  his  com 
mittee.  First,  Terry  appointed  a  commission  of  elite  scientists  and 
clinicians  to  study  the  issue of  smoking  and health;  he  successfully 
obviated  any easy dismissal of  the report by requiring that none  of  its 
members  had  previously  expressed  positions  on  the dangers  of  the 
cigarette.38  Second,  he  invited  the  tobacco  industry  to  review  a  list  of 
prospective  committee  members  and  reject  anyone  they  desired  to. 
This made  it impossible  for the industry to easily discredit  the report. 
The  "secret"  meetings  of  the  committee  generated  widespread  spec 
ulation  in  the  press  during  the  eighteen  months  of  its deliberations.39 
This  interest  culminated  in  the  nationally  televised  press  conference 
of  January  1964.  Sunday  newspapers  throughout  the  country  re 
ported  the  story  on  front  pages. 
By  1964,  in  the  aftermath  of  televised  presidential  debates,  a 
presidential  assassination,  and  a  growing  war  in  East  Asia,  all 
powerfully  portrayed  through  the  electronic  media,  the  expanding 
role  of  the media  and  possibilities  of  exploiting  them  for  a  range  of 
purposes,  including  public  health  education,  were  increasingly  recog 
nized.  Terry's  report  and  the  nationally  televised  press  conference 
made  the  surgeon  general,  for  the  first  time,  into  a public  figure  with 
access  to  the media.  It gave  the  office  a  new  meaning  and  authority 
which  subsequent  surgeon  generals  would  augment.  Indeed,  the 
surgeon  general's  principal  role?given  that  the  office  has  little 
funding  or  authority  to  initiate  programs?is  to  speak  effectively 
through  the media. 
In  the  struggle  concerning  the  "meaning"  of  the  cigarette,  control 
of  the media  was  bitterly  contested.  The  tobacco  industry  had 
considerable  resources  to  expend  in  this  fight,  attempting  to  allay  the 
growing  concerns  about  the  impact  of  smoking  on  health.  Advertise 
ments,  for  example,  continued  to  suggest  that  smokers  were  youthful, 
healthy,  attractive,  and  sexually  seductive.  Although  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  took  action  to  demand  a higher  level  of  account The  Cigarette,  Risk,  and American  Culture  167 
ability  from  the  industry,  regulations were  weak  and  difficult  to 
enforce.  The  anti-tobacco  forces  thus  pursued  other  strategies.  A 
young  consumer  lawyer,  John  Banzhaf  III, decided  to  attempt  to  get 
the FCC  to apply  the fairness doctrine  (for equal air time) to cigarette 
advertising. He  formed  the group ASH  (Action on  Smoking  and 
Health).  After  a  court  struggle,  he  forced  the  national  networks  to  air 
anti-smoking  spots  in  prime  time.  Anti-cigarette  ads  got  approxi 
mately  $40  million  of  free  air  time.  These  public-service  announce 
ments  apparently  did  have  an  impact;  per  capita  consumption  fell 
from 4,197  in 1966  to 3,969  in 1970.40 Given  the  success of  this 
anti-cigarette  media  blitz,  the  industry  then  acquiesced  to  a  legislative 
ban  on  broadcast  advertising,  thus  averting  the  fairness  doctrine.41 
Congressional  anti-smoking  policy proved  to be decidedly  limited. 
Modest  funding  for  public  education,  requiring  warning  labels  on 
packages,  and  banning  broadcast  advertising  constituted  the  entire 
federal  program  to  reduce  smoking.  At  the  same  time,  tobacco 
subsidies  were  maintained,  placing  the  government  in  the  ambiguous 
position  of working  to  limit cigarette  smoking while  simultaneously 
contributing  to  the  growth  of  tobacco.  The  limits of  the  federal 
program  revealed  the ongoing  power  of  the tobacco  lobby and  the 
economic  interests  that  it  represents.42 
TRANSFORMING  THE  MEANING  OF  CIGARETTE  SMOKING 
Additional  research  findings  about  the  nature  of  the  risks  of  cigarette 
smoking  served  to  tip  the  balance  in  favor  of  anti-smoking  forces 
during  the  last  decade.  Despite  considerable  gains  in  stigmatizing  the 
cigarette,  the  anti-smoking  forces  had,  by  the  late  1970s,  foundered 
on  a  traditional  American  libertarian  ethic:  "It's  my  body  and  I'll do 
with  it as  I please."  In keeping with  this powerful  cultural  ideal, 
further  governmental  interference  relating  to  smoking  was  seen  as 
constituting  unjustifiable  intrusion  into individual decisions.The  To 
bacco  Institute  viewed  such  intervention  as  "health  and  safety 
fascism."  It was  one  thing  for  the  government  to  inform  the  public 
about  the  dangers  of  smoking;  quite  another  to  restrict  or  ban  the 
behavior. 
For  this  reason,  scientific  studies  of  the  impact  of  "sidestream" 
smoke  took  on  special  significance.  With  the publication  of  studies 
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smoke?in  particular,  a higher  risk  of  lung  cancer?the  anti-smoking 
movement  was  reinvigorated  on  the  basis  of  a  powerful  communi 
tarian  ethic:  "Do  with  your  own  body  whatever  you  like,  but  you 
may  not  expose  others  to  risks  which  they  do  not  agree  to  take  on 
themselves."  As  epidemiologist  Michael  J.  Martin  explained,  "Many 
people  are willing  to  take  on  risk,  even  an  enormous  risk,  themselves. 
But  few  are willing  to  tolerate  even  a  small  risk  imposed  on  them."43 
With  the  imprimatur of  a new  Surgeon General's  Report  (1986),  the 
data  on  "involuntary"  smoking  led  to  remarkable  changes  in  the 
effectiveness  of  efforts  to  restrict  smoking  in  public  places.44  By 
mid-1988,  320  local  communities  had  adopted  laws  restricting 
smoking  in public  places,  up  from 90  in 1985.45 Cigarette  smoking 
was  banned  from virtually  all domestic  airline flights  beginning  in 
early  1990. 
Another  Surgeon General's Report  (1988) also called  into question 
the  voluntary  nature  of  cigarette  smoking,  now  for  the  smoker.46  By 
documenting  the  addictive  qualities  of  cigarette  smoking,  the  report 
further  undermined  the  notion  of  an  individual  voluntarily  "decid 
ing"  to  smoke.  Not  surprisingly,  the  tobacco  industry  challenged 
these  findings.  Walker  Merryman,  a  spokesman  for  the  industry's 
Tobacco  Institute, offered  a  socially  elastic  definition  of  addiction: 
"I've  not  heard  of  anyone  holding  up  a  liquor  store  or  mugging  an 
old  lady  to  get  the  money  to  buy  cigarettes."47  Nevertheless,  the 
recognition  that  cigarette  smoking  subjects  individuals  to  well 
recognized  biological  processes  of  transient  mood  alterations,  toler 
ance,  and  withdrawal  symptoms  led  increasingly  to  the  inclusion  of 
nicotine  addiction  as  one  more  aspect  of  substance  abuse,  a  deviant 
behavior.48  Moreover,  the  growing  recognition  of  the  difficulty  of 
quitting  undercut  the  notion  that  smoking  was  simply  a matter  of 
choice. 
Studies  of  the  risks  of  sidestream  smoke  and  the  addictive  nature  of 
cigarettes  were  promoted  by  a growing  anti-smoking  coalition  which 
included  physicians,  public  health  experts,  and  aggressive  consumer 
activists.  This,  of  course,  is not  to  question  the  scientific  validity  of 
such  studies,  but  rather  to  emphasize  the  relationship  between 
authoritative  science  and  its  social  and  political  context.  The  new 
research  agenda  facilitated  the  ongoing  process  of  delegitimizing 
cigarette  smoking  in American  culture.  The  cigarette?the  icon  of  our 
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individuality?had  become  suspect.  The  smoker  would  subsequently 
be  redefined,  in a process  which  we  continue  to  see  played  out?from 
the  independent  Marlboro  man  or  liberated  Virginia  Slim  to a new 
vision  of  a  weak,  irrational,  and  now,  addicted,  individual.  The 
innocuous  habit  had  become  the  noxious  addiction.  The  stigmatiza 
tion  of  the  cigarette  became  a  critical  aspect  of  a  revolution  in 
American  values  about  personal  health  and  behavior. 
The  stigma  of  the  cigarette  is now  tainting  its producers.  Increas 
ingly,  the  production  and  sale  of  such  a  clearly  dangerous  and 
damaging  product  is  being  viewed  as  a moral  issue;  the  cigarette 
companies  are  losing  their  standing  as  "reputable"  industries.49 
Major  social  institutions  have  moved  in  recent  months  to  sever  their 
ties  with  an  industry increasingly associated  in the public mind  with 
"marketing  death."  The  decisions  of Harvard  University  and City 
University  of  New  York,  for  example,  to  divest  their  endowment 
holdings  in  cigarette  companies  explicitly  expands  the moral  valence 
of  the  cigarette  issue,  further  isolating  the  industry.50  Despite  the 
continued  profitability  of  the  cigarette,  the  industry  is  losing  the 
tobacco  wars,  the  battle  to  maintain  a  legitimate  place  for  the 
cigarette  in American  culture. 
It would  nevertheless  be  premature  to  celebrate  the  decline  in 
cigarette  consumption.  Cigarettes  continue  to  exact  an  enormous  toll 
on  health  in  the United  States,  and,  increasingly,  throughout  the 
world.  According  to  recently  revised  figures,  390,000  deaths  each 
year  are  attributed  to  cigarette  smoking  in  the United  States  alone.51 
Smoking  is  estimated  to  cause  30  percent  of  all  cancer  deaths,  21 
percent  of  all  deaths  from  coronary  artery  disease,  and  82  percent  of 
all  deaths  from  chronic  obstructive  pulmonary  disease.  Since  1986, 
lung  cancer  has  become  the  leading  cause  of  cancer  deaths  among 
American  women,  surpassing  breast  cancer,  the  epidemiological 
result  of  the  rise  in women  smoking  since  the  1940s.  Smoking 
remains  the  "single  most  important  preventable  cause  of  death"  in 
the United  States.52  A  recent  federal  study estimated  that cigarettes 
cost  the nation  some  $52  billion  each year  in health  expenses  and 
time  lost  from  work.53  Despite  the  decline  in  smoking,  the  tobacco 
industry  remains  highly  profitable54  and  the  industry continues  to 
spend more  than  $2.5  billion  each  year  promoting  the  sale  of 
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As  cigarette  consumption  in  the United  States  has  declined,  multi 
national  tobacco  companies  have  worked  to market  their  product 
more  vigorously  in  the  developing  world.  Recent  worldwide  surveys 
of  cigarette  consumption  show  steep  increases  in Africa  and  Asia. 
The  World  Health  Organization  recently  characterized  the  commer 
cial  marketing  of  cigarettes  in  developing  nations  as  "intense  and 
ruthless."56  According  to WHO,  600,000  new  cases  of  lung  cancer 
now  occur  worldwide  every  year;  most  are  the  result  of  cigarette 
smoking.  By  the  year  2000,  the  annual  number  of  lung  cancer  cases 
may  be as high  as 2 million,  with  900,000  in  China  alone.57  In this 
sense,  the  risks  of  tobacco  consumption  truly  are  global;  changes  in 
Western  consumption  have  been  a  catalyst  for  accelerating  sales  in 
the  developing  world.58 
WHOSE  RISK  IS  IT, ANYWAY? 
With  cigarette  smoking  there  remains  a  complex  political  and 
cultural  conflict  about  risk  and  responsibility.  Consensus  about  the 
risks of  smoking  touched off an  important debate  about  the question 
of  responsibility  for risk:  Who  is responsible  for the serious burden of 
disease  imposed  by  cigarette  smoking?  In  this  respect,  the  first 
Surgeon  General's  Report  marks  an  important  watershed  in  the 
history  of  public  health.  The  government  accepted  new  responsibility 
for  the  elucidation  of  health  risks  through  epidemiological  studies. 
The  report  articulated  an  expanded  vision  of  public  health,  suggest 
ing  that  the  government  had  an  important  regulatory  function  in 
protecting  its citizens  from harmful products  by  identifying risks and 
educating  the  public. 
Nevertheless,  the  government  has  been  caught  in  an  ambiguous 
position  in  its  efforts  to  control  cigarette  smoking.  Given  the  history 
of  the prohibition  of  alcohol,  there  is little support  for an outright 
ban  on  cigarettes,  even  from  the  most  aggressive  anti-cigarette 
activists.  Advertising  remains  a  contested  area  of  public  policy,  but 
even  opponents  of  smoking  have  expressed  concern  that  a  total  ban 
may  conflict with  First Amendment  rights. Although  education  has 
been  effective  among  the  educated,  the  relationship  between  risk  and 
behavior  modification  remains  obscure.59  More  significant  than  any 
particular  federal  intervention  have  been  the  local  bans  on  smoking 
in  public  areas  and  workplaces,  which  have  created  a  powerful The  Cigarette,  Risk,  and American  Culture  171 
anti-smoking  social  environment.  In  a  relatively  short  time,  public 
space  has  been  subdivided;  cigarette  smoking  has  become  the most 
rigorously  defined  of  all public  behaviors. 
Recognizing  that  the  federal  government's  policy  options  regard 
ing cigarettes  are  limited,  some have  called  for a higher  standard of 
corporate  responsibility.  Smokers  who  have  incurred  serious  disease, 
acting as plaintiffs, have attempted  to fix  the burden of  responsibility 
squarely on  the tobacco  industry itself. In the last decade, hundreds of 
civil  suits have  been filed making  the claim  that the tobacco  compa 
nies persisted  in selling a  lethal product  all  the  while  knowing  (and 
obscuring)  the risks.  Given  the highly addictive nature of  the cigarette 
and the slick promotion  campaigns of  the industry, plaintiffs'  lawyers 
have  contended  that  the  companies  should  accept?in  compensatory 
damages?responsibility  for the debility  and death  their product  has 
wreaked. 
These  liability  suits have  generally  been  unsuccessful.  Although 
they  appeal  to  a populist,  anti-business  strain  of  thought  in American 
society,  typically  such  suits  have  failed  in  spite  of  the  ability  of 
lawyers  to  portray  the  industry  as  cynical  and  profit  driven.  Within 
American  society  there  is a powerful  expectation  regarding  individual 
responsibility  for risk taking. The  labeling and educational  activities 
of  the  government  have  served  to  reinforce  these  expectations.  As 
consensus  regarding  the  risks  of  the  cigarette  has  grown,  the  industry 
has,  ironically,  been  freed  of  responsibility  for  the  risks  of  its product. 
Increasingly,  Americans  have  come  to  accept  notions  of  individual 
responsibility  for  the  systemic  and  chronic  diseases.  Because  heart 
disease,  cancer,  and  other  diseases  are  powerfully  influenced  by  a 
range  of  individual  "life-style"  behaviors,  including  diet,  alcohol 
consumption,  and  smoking,  many  health  care  analysts  have  come  to 
emphasize  the  significance  of modifying  behaviors  to  affect health 
status,  and  more  generally,  patterns  of  disease.60 
Such  views  have  particular  appeal  in  the  context  of  the American 
health  culture, which  has historically  emphasized  the significance of 
an  individual's  responsibility  for  disease.  Americans,  in  this  respect, 
have  largely  come  to  reject  fatalistic  explanatory  models  of  disease 
and  its  causes.  Social  values  have  underscored  norms  which  suggest 
that individuals can and should  exert fundamental  control over  their 
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popularity,  for  example,  of  the  "Just  Say No"  campaign  against  illicit 
drugs  reflects  an  essentially  "voluntaristic"  notion  of  risk. 
As  effective  as  such values may  be  in serving  to define  healthful 
behaviors,  they  present  an  important  political  and  cultural  irony. 
According  to  this  behavioral  ethic,  those  who  continue  to  take  risks 
must  be  held  accountable  for  the  results;  but  this  emphasis  on 
individual responsibility may  deny  broader  social responsibilities  for 
health  and  disease.  This  view,  which  has  developed  increasingly 
powerful  adherents  in  the  last  decade,  actually  misrepresents  the 
history  of  cigarette  smoking  in  the  twentieth  century.  Smoking  is  a 
complex  behavior  which  has  reflected  deep  social,  cultural,  and 
economic  forces,  as well  as  a  powerful  biological  process  of  addic 
tion. Simply  identifying  individual behavior  as the primary vehicle  of 
risk negates  the fact that behavior  itself is, at times, beyond  the scope 
of  individual  agency.  Behavior  is  shaped  by  powerful  currents? 
cultural,  psychological,  as well  as  biological  processes?not  all  im 
mediately  within  the  control  of  the  individual.  Behaviors  such  as 
cigarette  smoking  are  sociocultural  phenomena,  not  merely  individ 
ual,  or  necessarily  rational. 
The  emphasis on personal  responsibility  for risk taking and disease 
has  come  at  the  very  moment  when  cigarette  smoking  is  increasingly 
stratified  by  education,  social  class,  and  race.  In  1985,  35  percent  of 
blacks  smoked  compared  with  29  percent  of  whites.61  For  college 
graduates  the proportion  of  smokers  fell from 28  percent  in 1974  to 
18  percent  in  1985;  for  those  without  a  college  degree  the  decrease 
during  the  same  period  was  from  36  to  34  percent.62  Thus,  to 
emphasize  individual  accountability  is  to  deny  that  some  groups  may 
be  more  susceptible  to  certain  behavioral  risks,  that  the  behavior 
itself  is not  simply  a matter  of  choice. 
In  assessments  of  environmental  risks,  we  have  often  considered 
who  lives  nearest  the  hazard;  the  recognition  that  such  risks  are 
externally  imposed  generates  social  concern  for  their  victims.  Such 
has not been  the case  with  risks associated with  individual behaviors; 
individuals  who  "take"?note  the  voluntaristic  bias?such  risks  are 
considered  ignorant,  stupid,  or  self-destructive.  But  perhaps  we  might 
begin  to rethink behavioral  risk; rather than simply hold  individuals 
accountable  for  the  risks  they  incur,  we  might  ask  who  is at  risk  to 
become,  or  remain,  a  cigarette  smoker  and  why. The  Cigarette,  Risk,  and American  Culture  173 
To  adequately  understand  the  answers  to  such  questions  will,  no 
doubt,  require  a new,  multidisciplinary  research  agenda  in which  the 
relationship  of  social  and  cultural  contexts  (including  powerful 
economic  forces) will  be  related  in a sophisticated way  to  individual 
psychological  motivations  to  engage  (or  disengage)  certain  risk 
behaviors.  We  need  to  better  understand  the meanings  of  particular 
behaviors  and  risks  to particular  groups  of  populations.  What  are  the 
biological,  psychological,  and  social  forces that make  it possible  for 
some  individuals  to  quit  smoking,  for  example,  while  others,  eager  to 
free themselves of  addiction,  nonetheless  fail?  And  finally, how may 
we  promote  cultural  shifts  that  enhance  both  personal  efficacy  and 
autonomy  in  the  name  of  health?  Until  we  can  adequately  answer 
these  questions,  the  cigarette  will  continue  to  be  a  powerful,  if not 
pervasive,  risk. 
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